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Abstract: Dewey defines open-mindedness as “freedom from prejudice, partisanship, and other such habits as close 
the mind and make it unwilling to consider new problems and entertain new ideas" (1910, p. 30). It is commonly 
included in lists of epistemic and argumentative virtues. We begin this paper with brief discussion of various accounts 
of open-mindedness. Our principal interest is in what it is to behave as an open-minded enquirer. Drawing on two 
cases, we consider whether open-minded behaviour varies between the contexts of solitary and community enquiry 
and whether inquirers face different challenges to behaving open-mindedly in each of these contexts. We conclude 
that although group deliberation introduces some extra barriers to open-mindedness, it can also make it easier to 
achieve by providing an external check that is absent in solitary inquiry.  
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1. Introduction  
 
In this paper our approach is not a definitional one. We are not attempting to come up with a 
definition of the virtue of open-mindedness or to amend or correct existing accounts. Rather, we 
are interested in what it is to behave in an open-minded way when engaged in cognitive endeavours 
the aim of which is to discover the truth about some matter or other or to work out what is the best 
or right thing to do in some situation or another. We are particularly interested in whether open-
minded behaviour varies between solitary and community enquiry situations and whether 
enquirers face different challenges to behaving open-mindedly in each of these situations. We take 
as our starting point, however, some standard accounts of open-mindedness that appear in the 
literature.  
Open-mindedness is commonly recognised as an intellectual virtue, indeed it often appears 
at the top of lists of the intellectual virtues, perhaps because, unlike some of the other intellectual 
virtues, it isn’t also recognised as a moral virtue.1 Much of the existing work on open-mindedness 
is in Philosophy of Education and here we see a connection to civic virtues and to the importance 
to virtuous citizenship of the tolerance of others’ perspectives and opinions, and more immediately 
to the pedagogical importance of open-mindedness in communities of teachers and learners. The 
development of Virtue Epistemology has seen interest develop in open-mindedness as a more 
                                                          
1 However, Linda Zagzebski argues that all intellectual virtues are also moral virtues (1996, p. 139). We make some 
brief remarks about the relationship between moral humility and the intellectual virtues later in the paper. 
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specifically epistemic virtue. In this guise open-mindedness is also valued as truth-conducive and 
cognitively worthwhile in the sense of it being conducive to cognitive achievement; to knowledge 
and to understanding.2 Until now little attention has been paid to differences in the practice of 
open-mindedness between the contexts of solitary and community inquiry.  
 
2. Some accounts of open-mindedness (and its attendant vices) 
 
There exists a continuum from a complete lack of open-mindedness to a complete inability to hold 
a firm belief on some matter or other. Hume characterises the closed-minded person as follows:  
 
To hesitate or balance perplexes their passion, and suspends their action. They are, 
therefore, impatient till they escape from a state, which to them is so uneasy; and 
they think, that they could never remove themselves far enough from it, by the 
violence of their affirmations and obstinacy of belief. (Hume (1955), p. 188). 
 
At the other end of the continuum is the person who is unable to make an epistemic commitment 
by reaching a conclusion or holding a firm belief. Such a person may be gullible, believing 
whatever they’ve most recently been told until someone tells them something that conflicts with 
it, or they may never take a position at all. The right degree of open-mindedness in a particular 
situation sits in the middle region of this continuum.  
In common with Dewey’s account, all accounts of open-mindedness identify impartiality, 
avoidance of biases, prejudice, and dogma as central. This also involves a preparedness to 
transcend beliefs you already hold. In acting open-mindedly, then, we implicitly acknowledge our 
own fallibility. William Hare characterises open-mindedness as follows: 
 
[A] person who is open-minded is disposed to revise or reject the position he holds 
if sound objections are brought against it, or, in the situation in which the person 
presently has no opinion on some issue, he is disposed to make up his mind in the 
light of available evidence and argument as objectively and as impartially as 
possible. . . . [W]e may adopt the attitude of open-mindedness with respect to highly 
particularized and specific beliefs or to more general and wide-ranging hypotheses, 
theories, and conceptual frameworks. The object of one’s open-mindedness varies, 
but the meaning of open-mindedness remains constant. (1979, p. 9) 
 
Likewise Daniel H. Cohen writes, 
 
Part of open-mindedness is the ability to listen carefully, the willingness to listen 
carefully, the willingness to take what others say seriously, and, if called for, the 
resolve to adopt them as one’s own. That is the part that most textbooks on critical 
thinking note. There is another, complementary part, however. Open-mindedness 
has to include the willingness, ability, and resolve to re-examine one’s own beliefs 
and, if called for, to let them go. (2009, p. 56) 
 
                                                          
2 Rebecca Taylor (2013) makes a case for open-mindedness as contributing not only to the achievement of 
knowledge but also of understanding.  
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Open-mindedness as a characteristic of one’s approach to one’s own beliefs is often central 
to those accounts that focus on open-mindedness as part of a virtue epistemology. Like Hare and 
Cohen, Jason Baehr also emphasises a willingness to interrogate one’s own beliefs, describing the 
open minded person as, 
 
[C]haracteristically (a) willing and (within limits) able (b) to transcend a default 
cognitive standpoint (c) in order to take up or take seriously the merits of (d) a 
distinct cognitive standpoint. (2011, p. 202) 
 
The presence of condition (b) seems to have the effect of restricting open-mindedness to those 
cases in which one already has a belief about some matter or other and is presented with an 
alternative, whereas there are cases in which we have no existing view on a matter but are open to 
coming to a belief, and in such cases being open (in the first instance) to almost all possible truths 
about that matter could still prove truth-conducive. Further, Baehr’s focus on the importance of a 
willingness to revise one’s own beliefs overshadows the traditional emphasis on impartiality, 
avoidance of bias, and so on. In similar vein Wayne Riggs gives an account of open-mindedness 
as a sort of meta virtue – a disposition to learn about, avoid and control our bad habits; that is as a 
habit of good inquiry the focus of which is our relationship to our own beliefs. According to Riggs, 
open-mindedness has two characteristics: 
 
 Self-knowledge – seeking and accepting self-knowledge about our own 
cognitive strengths and weaknesses (careless mistakes, bias, over-
confidence, wishful thinking) 
 Self-monitoring – making that awareness efficacious (2010, pp. 182-84) 
 
This account enables us to make sense of striving to be more open-minded in the context of striving 
to be better inquirers – we can seek more knowledge, we can practise and get better at self-
monitoring.  
 
3. Open-mindedness in solitary inquiry vs open-mindedness in group inquiry 
 
In this section we first set up cases of solitary and group inquiry (respectively) and go on to reflect 
upon differences in the ways in which open-mindedness is played out in each context. 
 
Solitary Inquiry 
Suppose a friend tries to convince you to stop eating meat, for moral reasons. Your first response 
is to be sceptical that this is really the conclusion that the reasons support, but they do make you 
wonder whether maybe you should eat less meat and pay more attention to its provenance. Your 
friend’s evangelical vegetarianism annoys you, so you decide to research the question “What 
should I eat?” by yourself.  
How to proceed? You should: 
 
• Make a first pass at figuring out what information you lack that bears on the 
question at hand.  
TRACY BOWELL AND JUSTINE KINGSBURY 
4 
• Seek information from reputable sources, and if there is disagreement about 
which are the reputable sources (which there probably is in this case), consult a 
range of them. 
• Set your starting position aside and evaluate the arguments on their merits. 
• Try to be aware of biases that might prevent you doing so. 
• Be prepared to change your way of approaching the question in the light of new 
information or lines of argument you haven’t thought of. 
• Be prepared to revise your view.  
 
In other words, you should be open-minded. And if you’re not, arguably you aren’t actually 
engaged in an inquiry at all. 
 
Group Inquiry 
Suppose there are compulsory papers in the philosophy major, and your department is meeting to 
consider whether there should continue to be compulsory papers. There are six of you, and you are 
evenly divided on this question.  
Those who are in favour of compulsory papers express the following starting positions: 
 
• A thinks we should stick with the status quo. The material covered in those 
papers is core – no-one should be able to complete a philosophy major without 
covering it.  
• B thinks we should stick with the status quo. There is a university-wide move 
towards compulsory papers in majors, and it would be unwise to try to swim 
against the tide. The current compulsory papers cover the most important areas 
of philosophy, though perhaps they could be modified slightly in both content 
and presentation to make them more appealing to a wider range of students. 
• C sees no reason to change the status quo, and he does not want to antagonize 
A and B.  
 
Meanwhile, those who are against compulsory papers express the following starting positions: 
 
• D thinks it would be good to do away with the current compulsory papers 
because they lack wide appeal and are deterring students from majoring in 
philosophy. He thinks that A and B are arguing in favour of the compulsory 
papers because they teach in those papers and want to keep their enrolments up.  
• E thinks the element of compulsion should be dropped entirely, because she is 
opposed to anything supported by A. She thinks it would be better to defer the 
discussion until C retires, because then the numbers are more likely to stack up 
on her side. 
• F thinks no papers should be compulsory. She thinks that doing the number of 
philosophy papers required for the major provides a good grounding no matter 
which papers they are. 
 
Clearly this could be a somewhat fraught meeting. Some of the starting positions (E’s, at least) 
suggest a lack of open-mindedness at the outset. We can’t tell yet whether the others will be open-
minded, but they all have a view and reasons in support of it – no-one is uncommitted at the outset, 
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and everyone, except possibly C, who presumably knows that his reasons are weak, is likely to 
argue for their view. Is there any way for this inquiry to go well? If all the discussants are open-
minded and assume others are too, then there is. They need to be open to the possibility that the 
right outcome is not the one they came into the discussion supporting. If they are open-minded in 
this way, they will: 
 
• Present their arguments clearly, briefly and without undue rhetorical force.  
• Listen to others’ arguments and evaluate those arguments on their merits. 
• Avoid ad hominem responses and reactions. 
• Allow enough time for discussion, and not try to dominate the discussion. 
• Be prepared to defer the decision in order to find out relevant facts that are not 
immediately available. 
 
In common with the solitary case, if you’re not inquiring open-mindedly, it doesn’t look 
like inquiry proper at all. When you are presenting your own arguments in the group inquiry 
situation, if you assume others are open-minded, it becomes unnecessary to bluster or to make 
emotional appeals, and if you are open-minded, you shouldn’t want to carry the day unless you are 
right. The effect that behaving open-mindedly and treating others as open-minded has on both 
one’s own conduct within the inquiry as well as that of one’s interlocutors demonstrates the way 
in which open-mindedness contributes to cognitive achievement as the end of good inquiry.  
Although open-mindedness acts as a mitigating force against the vice of being incapable 
of taking a firm stance on a matter, there will be situations in which open-mindedness requires that 
a decision be deferred. Some questions ought to be able to be settled on the spot: for example, 
what are our aims, and how should we weight them? (There are several aims stated in the initial 
set-up: increasing the number of philosophy majors, improving the student experience, ensuring 
that majors have a good grounding in philosophy, complying with university policy or staying 
onside with the university administration.) Other questions may need some research that can’t be 
done on the spot. What are the facts? Is there reason to think that prospective majors are deterred 
by the compulsory courses? What are these reasons? Do we have evidence about what learning 
attributes have been acquired by students who graduate from philosophy programmes without 
compulsory courses, compared to those who graduate from ones with compulsory courses? What 
is the status of the shift in university policy: must all majors henceforth have compulsory courses 
(finding out that this was so would remove one of the options from consideration), or can a 
department argue for an exception if it thinks there are good grounds?  
We note that there are situations that look like group inquiry, but aren’t genuine instances. 
One kind of example is the phony consultation into whether something should be done when in 
fact the decision has already been made. The possible situation in which some of our inquirers A 
– E (above) are not genuinely interested in the others’ views, and are aiming to push their own 
views through regardless of what others think, is perhaps another case of this. In situations where 
there are more than two inquirers, if just one person is not being open-minded, their lack of open-
mindedness might not derail the inquiry, provided the others display certain other epistemic virtues. 
For instance, they need to be intellectually courageous in particular, to stand up to someone who 
isn’t responding properly to argument. They need to exercise epistemic trust in one another, 
trusting in the others’ honesty and, indeed, in their exercising open-mindedness. They need to be 
epistemically humble in order to be open to the contributions of those who are more junior than 
them or who, on the face of it, know less about, or have less experience of, the subject of the 
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inquiry. In similar vein, they need to recognize reliable authority. The virtues that promote good 
communication may also come into play: intellectual honesty and an awareness of one’s audience 
and how they are likely to respond (if they are your colleagues, you are likely to have a pretty good 
awareness).  
Notice also that in behaving open-mindedly, the virtuous group inquirer also displays the 
moral virtue of humility. She treats her interlocutors as equally entitled to have their views listened 
to, and she listens to those views respectfully. On the face of it, though, it seems that an inquirer 
could display moral humility without displaying epistemic humility. For instance, someone might 
consider themselves to be a better reasoner than her co-inquirers, and have good reason to do so, 
yet still take time to listen to their views out of respect for them as persons who have an entitlement 
to air those views. Thus it seems that while moral humility provides a backdrop to intellectual 
humility, morally positioning inquirers so that they give proper recognition to others, it may not 
necessarily lead to their displaying intellectual humility. In the solitary case, however, it is more 
likely that an enquirer could manage to exercise intellectual virtues in the absence of any general 
humility since she doesn’t need to display any respect for co inquirers, only for views that she may 
encounter in the course of her enquiry. She may treat these as disembodied and anonymous, indeed, 
on some understandings of virtuous inquiry, her inquiry may be better if she does so,   
 
4. Barriers to open-mindedness 
 
Elsewhere we have noted barriers that may limit or prevent inquirers in acquiring and displaying 
virtues of inquiry. These include intellectual, social, psychological and emotional impediments to 
virtuous inquiry.3 In the case of open-mindedness, are the barriers any different as between the 
solitary and group inquirer? Irrespective of whether we are engaged in solitary or group inquiry, 
our tendencies towards confirmation bias, belief persistence, and so on are what one might think 
of as hardwired barriers to open-mindedness. Open-mindedness doesn’t come naturally to us. 
There are also issues of time and resources. Not everything can, or needs to be, researched in detail 
in order properly to arrive at a decision or conclusion. In the group case, however these issues may 
be exponentially worse simply because there are more people involved who may have these biases, 
so the sheer amount of biases that need to be overcome increases; there may be more people who 
want a chance to state their view and so exacerbate the time problem; more people might mean 
more information that needs checking and verifying, and so on. In our department meeting case, 
for example, each of the six may feel the need to state their view in detail even though it has, in 
essence, been stated before by one of their colleagues. Or someone may want to delay making a 
decision until certain further information, such as the opinions of students on compulsory papers, 
has been provided and taken into account.  
Other problems may arise in the group case for reasons other than the simple increase in 
inquirers. Biases towards or against particular people may have more effect on your behaviour 
when the people are actually present. There is less opportunity to consider and reflect before 
speaking and thus to self-monitor and avoid problematic responses such as ad hominem responses. 
So particularly where open-mindedness is understood as a kind of meta virtue, as for example in 
Riggs’ account (above), it does seem as though it requires more effort to achieve than in the solitary 
case where one is not reacting to the contributions (and provocations) of others. Further, problems 
such as feeling intimidated, which can be a response to the written word as well, seem much more 
pressing in the face-to-face context. Similarly, the presence of co-inquirers might provide reasons 
                                                          
3 See our (2016). 
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not to be completely candid – some of them institutional, some of them arising from your 
knowledge of how your co-discussants are likely to react. The potential for these kinds of problems 
is well-illustrated by the case we set up (above). The fact that the discussants are enquiring in a 
professional context means that there are certain constraints on their behaviours. For instance, D 
may want to call A and B out on what he suspects is their self-interested bias, and from the truth-
seeking perspective should do so, but is aware that expressing himself too candidly could damage 
working relationships with his colleagues. In the group inquiry case, the very presence of other 
people as well as their arguments makes open-minded inquiry more challenging than it is in the 
solitary case. This demonstrates that in practice one’s argumentative capital has to be balanced 
with one’s social capital and that the need to find that balance means that the pursuit of truth is not 
entirely free and unfettered but limited by social needs, amongst others.  
Conversely, some aspects of the group case can make that context of inquiry easier than 
the solitary context. In solitary inquiry, you and only you are responsible for tracking down the 
arguments against your view, and you may overlook some. In a group inquiry, if the group is 
sufficiently diverse, you can expect at last some of that work to be done for you. In solitary inquiry, 
there are no external checks on your open-mindedness. In group inquiry, there is the possibility of 
the discussion going meta and referring directly to inquirer’s responsibilities to enquire according 
to certain standards, thus someone may pull you up on failures to give proper weight to what others 
are saying. It seems at least possible, then, that the group might be more open-minded – or, might 
conduct a more open-minded inquiry – than any of the individuals in it are capable of if left to 
inquiry in a solitary context. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
In this paper our focus has been on what open-mindedness looks like in practice and whether there 
are interesting differences between bring open-minded in the context of solitary inquiry vs being 
open-minded in the context of group inquiry. Reflection on our cases of solitary and group inquiry 
suggests that being open-minded when engaged in a solitary inquiry can be easier in that there is 
no need to negotiate the social and practical complexities of interacting with other inquirers and 
their views. On the other hand, solitary inquiry may be less thorough because the responsibility 
for considering all the possible facts about the matter at hand sits with a single individual. 
Moreover, the solitary inquirer may tend to be less open-minded because in the group case, one’s 
co inquirers can act as a check against closed-mindedness and provide an immediate and embodied 
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